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Neoliberal privatisation is suffering from a legitimacy
crisis, an efficiency crisis (concerning prices, quality
and access), and a crisis of profitability – but crises
do not necessarily lead to an end to privatisations, rat -
her they lead to new ways and strategies for making
them more effective. Politicians and investors are loo -
king for other (investment) opportunities. Nevertheless,
we can observe shifts in the social climate that enable
successes in anti-privatisation campaigns, foster remu -
nicipalisations and the debate about the public sphere.
The water supply for the population of Paris is to be
completely restored to public ownership from 2009 on,
as the Socialist mayor Delanoe announced on June 2nd
2008. To date, the clean water treatment is the responsi-
bility of SAGEP, a semi-state-owned limited company,
while the distribution to the consumers is in the hands of
Veolia and Suez, the well-known transnational corpora-
tions. But their contracts will not be renewed, and this
will enable a municipal restructuring with the long-term
aim of “stabilising water prices”. After Grenoble, this
would be the second spectacular case of remunicipalisa-
tion of water in France. The examples of Potsdam or
Fürstenwalde show that this is also happening success-
fully in Germany. It seems to have become easier to
mobilise people against the sale of their water utilities.
In this way, it was possible to stop a planned water pri-
vatisation in Hamburg with the aid of a successful citi-
zen's referendum. The Berlin citizen's initiative to dis-
close the water privatisation contracts is heading in the
same direction.1
1. Crises of Legitimacy
Liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation – the dis-
sonances in this triad of neoliberal modernisation are
becoming loud and clear. The dispossession and valori-
sation of public property was a decisive element in ope-
ning new investment possibilities for excess capital and
private enrichment. These policies of appropriation lead
to disastrous social effects – reduction in public
employment, conversion of regular to precarious wor-
king conditions, price increases on previously afforda-
ble public services, restriction of social rights and of
opportunities for democratic decision-making (cf. Dick-
haus/Dietz 2006; Weizsäcker et al. 2006; Huffschmid
2004) – as a price for partially better and 'more efficient'
services for those who can afford them. Due to these
disastrous effects, demands are raised for protection
against intensified competition, with calls for regulation
and public control. Now there is growing resistance to
the selling off of public companies. 
An opinion poll carried out by the German weekly
newspaper Die Zeit (on August 9, 2007) showed that
67 per cent of those asked would rather have compa-
nies like the Deutsche Bahn (German train services),
Telekom and the provision of energy left under the res-
ponsibility of the state. According to another opinion
poll (by the dimap-Institute in Germany) more than
75 per cent reject a privatisation of water. The state
is “fashionable again”, the FAZ complained, the most
important conservative German newspaper (on August
5, 2007, p.32). The political promotion of the project to
privatize the German train services especially led to a
rapid increase in scepticism in public opinion (cf. Forsa,
2008), in the political parties and in the media. The
theme of privatisation was first considered as political-
ly relevant in 2007 and was clearly and critically repor-
ted on in the media. 
According to a poll of the Forsa opinion research insti-
tute in January 2008, only 47% of the population still
accepted a privatisation of public services. Privatisation
experiences are seen to be more on the negative side by
52%. "Further privatisations are considered more criti-
cally." General acceptance has clearly decreased com-
pared to the 1990s. 
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2At the same time, however, 80% of the population be-
lieve that the state works more bureaucratic and less
flexible than private services; 71% think that private
companies are more efficient, cheaper (61%) and also
friendlier (58%). And this despite the fact that the pri-
vate sector only seeks high profits (74%). 
This not only shows the sustainability of the privati-
sation ideology but also a “bizarre” composed general
“common sense” (Gramsci): Although the majority
believes that private companies were cheaper and more
efficient, the majority believes at the same time that
they raised prices in an uncontrolled fashion (68%) and
that only the state guarantees a provision for all regions
(58%), with adequate prices (52%) and the maintenance
of service quality (49%) – a very contradictory terrain.
This is not a crazy thing, but reflects different experien-
ces: privatisation politics used to enjoy broad accep-
tance because it promised the restitution of efficiency
with respect to the really deteriorating state of many
public utilities, it promised a reduction in costs and pri-
ces in the course of competition, a new freedom of choi-
ce for customers because of the diversity of providers
and products, as well as solutions to the public finance
crises through profits from the sales. But 20 years of
experience with privatised services showed: the promi-
ses were not kept. The reduction in services has unco-
vered the efficiency gains through privatisation as a
myth; instead of a reduction in costs we face higher pri-
ces for energy, gas, water, health; the new freedom of
choice turns out to be an opaque chaos with respect to
tariffs, and is offered by only a few providers which are
partially organised as an oligopoly; and the crisis in
public finances was also only reduced in rare cases on a
short-term basis by privatisation gains, usually by sel-
ling off the “family jewels”, especially in the municipa-
lities, and this led to long-term income losses or high
subsequent costs for municipalities; and far too often
privatisation massively fostered corruption. 
This dismal reality leads to a new “privatisation disen-
chantment”, and at the same time it revives political
action against privatisations as well as direct
democracy. Over 160 citizen's referendums against pri-
vatisation have been initiated in Germany, and 32 were
even successful, others were terminated after privatisa-
tion projects were forced to be abandoned beforehand.
The recent case of Leipzig attracted a lot of attention,
where 87 per cent of the city's voting population voted
against selling the city's companies on 27th January
2008. The moratorium on privatisation in Leipzig is
initially valid for three years. In Freiburg, Heidelberg
and Rostock, selling off municipal housing was preven-
ted by citizen's referendums too. 
2. „Failed Privatisations“ – Crisis of
Efficiency and Profitability
Meanwhile, we often hear about „failed states“– now
the serious legitimacy crisis of privatisation is also
increasingly nurtured by failed privatisation projects.
The best known example is the disaster of the British
railway system. Its tracks were finally taken over again
by the state. State interventions such as these become
necessary to assume the debts of bankrupt companies
and to secure the provision of important public goods
(cf. Rügemer 2008). The most spectacular recent re-
socialisation of railways is to be observed in New Zea-
land. The privatisations in the housing sector also fail to
meet entrepreneurial expectations. Municipalities sold
vast areas of city housing to big international private
3equity funds that promised a long-term involvement,
and also to adhere to social standards and still increase
profits. However, big corporations like Cerberus resold
their new acquisitions after a short time because profits
were very much lower than expected. Spectacular buy-
ing plans were repeatedly postponed.
In this situation, investors increasingly move from
direct performance and control attempts to a strategy of
valorisation through financialisation and Public-Priva-
te-Partnerships. One example of a crisis of profitablity
is water supply and sanitation: investment funds now
“do not want to manage water but want to manage
money,“ Eric Swyngedouw writes (2008). No satisfac-
tory profits can be made with water because of the enor-
mous infrastructural requirements (especially in coun-
tries of the 'global South'), unless state subsidies are
made available. If this is the case, “then“, Marx writes
in the Grundrisse, „capital rolls off“ the provision of
respective reproduction conditions “to the state“ (MEW
42, p. 437). Correspondingly, Adam Smith already
advocated that such “public goods“ have to be provided
by the state.2 Meanwhile, even the Federation of Ger-
man Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie,
BDI) is complaining about international competitiven-
ess being endangered because of the lack of investment
in power plants, electricity supply, and roads, and there-
fore calls for “ten per cent more state investment in
infrastructure“ (FR, 27 May 2008). Indeed we can assu-
me that the infrastructure that would be necessary for
the reproduction of capital cannot be adequately provi-
ded by private companies and that therefore the serious
crisis of public provision of infrastructure is increa-
singly in contradiction to the private clearance sale of
public resources. In this sense privatisation becomes
unproductive for the overall profitability of capital.  
So, at a first glance, the heydays of privatisation seem to
be over (Rilling 2008). The number of privatisations as
well as the privatisation gains in the EU decreased from
about 70 billion Euros in 2005 to about 40 billion Euros
in 2007. The largest proportion of 41 per cent of the
gains were achieved with the privatisation of financial
institutions and banks, followed by the sale of electrici-
ty providers (21%) and telecommunications companies
(19%; PB 2008, p. 11). The main focus of privatisations
worldwide has shifted away from the European Union
to China and Russia (also to Eastern Europe).3 In addi-
tion to the legitimacy problems, decreasing privatisa-
tion gains and projects are caused by the fact that the
significant and especially the profitable areas of public
property have already been privatised, that the prospec-
ts for stable profits in the remaining areas are rather
sparse and that currently the financing of further priva-
tisations by investors - especially private equity funds –
have “started to splutter” due to the subprime and credit
crisis (cf. Candeias/Rilling 2008). It is to be expected,
however, that the big state funds of China, the Arab sta-
tes and others will play a much larger role in the future
in financing privatisations (cf. Kaufmann 2008). Cur-
rently, the investors' interest at the moment is more than
ever focussed on profitable jewels, as hospitals or rail-
ways-systems in Germany and France. 
So, the assumption that the investment possibilities
would increasingly start to diminish is wrong. In total,
Germany and France were still top of Europe in 2006
with nearly 9 billion Euros of privatisation gains but
Germany lost the dubious title in 2007 with only a little
more than 6, 7 billion Euros in privatisation gains, far
behind France with nearly 14,7 billion Euros (PB 2008,
9).4 The politics of privatisation are increasingly shifting
to the municipal and regional level, and are relatively
unimpeded in enforcing Public-Private-Partnerships as
the new magical solution for privatisation, concentra-
ting on the areas of health, education, and transport.
Every third city is still planning further privatisations
(Ernst & Young 2007). Even housing privatisations are
still continuing: in June 2008, the government of North
Rhine-Westphalia sold 93,000 flats to the US real estate
fund Whitehall despite the protest with a citizen's refe-
rendum that collected 66.000 signatures. Whitehall now
owns approximately 800,000 rented flats in Germany.
But, as mentioned above, public opinion is contradic-
tory concerning privatisation: a majority believes that
some areas as theatres and museums, public transport,
and even employment offices could be privatised. Fol-
lowing Smith's reasoning, a public good is only an
exception “in the general common sense” from the
otherwise well-functioning market-lead (capitalist) pro-
duction. Other areas are considered to be the core part
of public ownership and control: an overwhelming
majority of over 90% endorse the idea that justice, poli-
ce and the fire brigade should remain in the hands of the
state, together with financial administration, schools
and universities as well as pension funds, (according to
the Forsa opinion research institute). 2 „Certain goods which though they may be in the highest degree
advantageous to a great society are, however, of such a nature that
the profits could never repay the expenses to any individual or
small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be
expected that any individual or small number of individuals should
erect.” (Smith 1776/1976, Book V, 244). 
3 Privatisation gains in China are steadily increasing at an incredib-
ly fast rate and already reached nearly 42 billion Euros in 2007, for
instance by selling companies like PetroChina (6,14 billion Euros)
or China Shenhua Energy (6,07 billion Euros; cf. PB, p. 7). 
4 The Privatization Barometer provides handy internationally com-
parable data, however, in the case of Germany, they only consider
privatisations on the municipal and regional level to an inadequa-
te extent, and therefore systematically underestimate the number
of privatisations. 
43. Deprivatisation and Remunicipa-
lisation – but how?
This contradictory public opinion is reflected also in
politics. More and more often, waste disposal, water uti-
lities, electricity supply or housing are being deprivati-
sed or remunicipalised. Not only Paris, but even every
tenth city in Germany is planning to reverse privatisati-
ons (cf. Ernst & Young 2007).  Only a minority of 16%
of the population still approve further privatisation of
municipal property, and already 28% support the option
of deprivatisation. Thus the myths of privatisation are
hardly believed any more but the project of privatisati-
on itself is still being continued – although in a modified
way. This is also due to a lack of alternatives. Demands
such as 'Water is not for sale', for instance, support the
creation of myths from the left. Water has been sold for
a long time and also had to be paid for even when pro-
vided by the state, Eric Syngedouw (2008) insists –
affordable access to water for all is not synonymous
with the commodity goods form. 
Only few re-municipalisations of public companies of
the basic services of public interest have been carried
out so far, when compared with the number of privati-
sations. However, since they seemingly breached the
privatisation logic (“ineff i c i e n t - e x p e n s i v e - b u r e a u c r a-
tic“), they attracted wide attention. For instance, the
most famous example of municipalisation of waste dis-
posal in Bergkamen, was already called the “Orange
Revolution“.5 Critics of neoliberalism are told that not
only private enterprise could do it “cheaper and bet-
ter“.6 Moreover, the previously absent economic suc-
cess of municipal companies is explained by the lack of
microeconomic know-how and entrepreneurial manage-
ment (Wiebe/Schürer 2007). Now they would follow
microeconomic models and excavate reserves of ratio-
nalisation.7 However, this only shows "that an accep-
tance of the economisation of social services has been
enforced in the shadow of the legitimacy crises". Even
in the cases of successful remunicipalisation, as, for
example, waste disposal in Bergkamen, there is often a
reference to higher efficiency and lower costs in the
municipal companies. If public utilities are only asses-
sed by purely economic indicators, this already follows
the neoliberal logic. Remunicipalisation alone does not
solve any problem, since this does not automatically
mean an exit “from the microeconomic logic” of com-
petitiveness, profit maximisation, and pure economic
rationality (Holm 2008). 
Therefore, the “public” must be considered more com-
prehensively: it has to guarantee the general conditions
of reproduction for each single person within the mea-
ning of a social right, this means to provide everybody
and every region with low priced (or even free) high
quality services, and at the same time to maintain high
environmental and health standards, to create qualitati-
vely good employment with standard wages, to secure
investment in all important areas like the careeconomy
(including cross subsidies) and to enable far-reaching
democratic participation in the production and distribu-
tion of public services for all – including employees and
consumers, also – in the end – to gain “control in asso-
ciation with others over” the relevant living conditions
(Holzkamp 1987, p. 14). This would require a certain
voluntary commitment of the municipal decision-
makers and a corresponding detailed codification, since
the municipal decision-makers change after each elec-
tion period, and the decisions and the motivations on
remunicipalisation would change accordingly.
At the moment, however, the practice of remunicipali-
sation still shows the scars from the struggle against pri-
vatisation. Competition, profit and efficiency are defi-
ned as significant characteristics of the “public sphere“,
to counteract the allegations of bureaucratic inefficien-
cy – whereby it should not be forgotten that the cost-
effectiveness of a company is important, but there are
usually other additional reasons for remunicipalisation.
The definition of the “public sphere“ in politics is often
quite narrow, as the current example of the rural district
of Lüneburg shows. On December 31, 2007, the con-
tract with the corporation on the collection and transport
of waste in the district ended. The district previously
rejected the renewal of the contract with Remondis and
a procurement throughout Europe and transferred the
waste collection and disposal to a limited company
(Gesellschaft für Abfallwirtschaft Lüneburg – GfA), of
which 50% is owned by the district and 50% by the city
of Lüneburg, and whose aim was to build and maintain
a central landfill site of the district and the city until
2007. Due to the transfer of the service provision to a
limited company in public ownership, this is already
called a “remunicipalisation“ (Schreiber 2007, 1). 
In addition, a subsidiary company, Dienlog GmbH, was
founded in March 2004 already – according to the poli-
tical decision-makers with consent by trade union and
employees' representatives. This construction is now
specifically being criticised by the trade union and the
media. The business report 2006 reveals that since then,
new employees have solely been appointed in the subsi-
diary Dienlog. These jobs are not based on the public
5 Report by the German TV magazine ›Monitor‹ on 18 January
2007, “Die 'orangene Revolution' – Städte holen die Müllabfuhr
von Privaten zurück“.
6 Said by the executive vice-chairman of the association of munici-
pal waste management and city cleaning (VKS), Achim Schröter,
cited in: “Kommunen wollen mit Hausmeistereien wieder Geld
verdienen, newspaper Welt online, 2 March 2007.
7 According to the website of the German public services trade
union, Ver.di, on remunicipalisation: http://kommunalverwaltung.
verdi.de/ themen/rekommunalisierung
5sector collective agreement, but on a pay scale that is
“in accordance with the regulations of the private waste
disposal economy“ (George 2008). This decision is
justified with the maintenance and improvement of
competitiveness with respect to private corporations,
especially in case of procurement throughout Europe.
Standard wage structures were formally guaranteed, but
the collective labour agreement of the public services
(TVöD) was restricted, even though the executive direc-
tor of the GfA emphasizes that employees “would not
automatically” earn less. Price stability for customers of
public services is pitted against the working conditions
and wages of public company employees. Additionally,
the fees for waste disposal are not reduced and the exe-
cutive director cannot guarantee price stability (ibid.).
This construction – a municipal company with subsidi-
ary companies to hire employees outside the collective
bargaining agreements – can be found elsewhere in
Lüneburg as well. The clinic, for instance, was transfor-
med into a city company: the health care employees are
still paid according to the collective wage agreement
(TVöD), but especially the cleaning and kitchen person-
nel was outsourced to a service limited company: there
they were first paid 10% more than in the private sector,
but 7% less than before in the public sector (Meyer-
Timpe/Rudzio 2006). Double standards are applied to
employees: ‘Low qualified' employees are separated
from 'qualified' employees, and under the pressure of
impending unemployment and the alleged needs of effi-
ciency and competitiveness they are subjected to other
wage standards.
The re-entry into public property that has been initiated
in the process of remunicipalisation shows that the use
of market mechanisms is by no means ruled out, but is
even required in the concept of many of those involved
to sustain their position within the labour competition.
The “public services” show a wide range of different
forms of marketisation and (re-)municipalisation, and
without having developed a conceptual aim of the 'com-
munal' (municipal) or 'public sphere', this does not
necessarily mean an antonym to privatisation. Although
municipalities and communes can regain influence over
municipal companies, the extent to which this exceeds a
microeconomic and market-orientated logic based on
private enterprise, and actually adopts a diff e r e n t
'public' character that also considers other interests and
needs, depends on the virtual orientation, participatory
organisation and management of a municipal company.
If remunicipalisation is to be more than just a change in
ownership, then it is a process that develops its own sig-
nificant social and economic quality of public service
(see Hachfeld 2008). Therefore, what does “common
good” mean as an “antonym“ to privatisation?
4. Pleading For “The Public”
In the Anglo-American language area, the terms 'com-
mons' (common goods) or 'common' are used which
relate to the Latin word 'communicare', 'sharing' or
'participating', 'communicating' or the 'shared good', the
term 'public' as a contrary point of reference enjoys
increasing acceptance when describing alternatives
to the rhetoric and politics of private enterprise
(Ostrom/Laerhoven 2007; Rilling 2001; 2005; Rössler
2001).8 The „Commons“ refer to commonly owned or
used natural goods or material resources (water, fishe-
ries, raw materials, forests, land, air, fauna) or even
common social and cultural resources (spaces, know-
ledge, ideas, traditions), the “public realm“ encompas-
ses much more than just the “public“ that is usually
identified with the sphere of the media. The adjective
'public' characterises many different items: goods, ser-
vices of general interest, property, companies, employ-
ment, spaces, communication, law, and decisions are
decorated with this term. These issues especially lead to
political controversy and the 'public' functions as a kind
of antonym to 'private' when there are conflicts about
public goods, basic services of public interest, public
property, public and state-subsidised employment, the
public sector or public services, public order, public
interest, public space or participation of the public in
decision-making. Admittedly, these issues are usually
not seen as related and politically connected. The inhe-
rent conflicts are often seen as single issues just like the
involved activists. The political areas of the party pro-
grammes are also not differentiated according to public
or private issues. There are family parties, pensioners',
and workers' parties or even popular parties but there is
no party of the public and certainly no private party.
Therefore, we are dealing with very different but social-
ly and economically important issues that are common-
ly defined as being public. What then is the 'Public'?
It is a relation between actors that accounts for The
Other and ultimately the General Interest beyond the
private and the individual. It is a space for discussion
and action, and society is always present: as a reference
that not only considers private interests but also those of
the others, and hence a common or general interest is
accessible through co-partnership and can be develo-
8 The German expression 'Das Öffentliche' ('the public’) does not
seem to have a direct translation in English [translator's note].
Since the 17th century, the term public good, or 'common good'
incurred the meaning of the adjective 'common' (koinos in Greek,
lat. communis) and hence the normative and identity-shaping poli-
tical and social aspect of being oriented towards common welfare:
public welfare, common public interest, public order etc. – in
short: the reference to the aspired good “public order“ of the com-
munity (“salus publica“) that evolves in the political process. The
Latin word publicus later adopted the meaning of 'governmental'.
In a different way, this made the 'public' – as for instance in 'public
order' an antonym to the 'Private', cf. Rinken (1988).
6ped.9 The public sphere as a social and political form of
movement is an operation of opening and expansion and
it creates the situation of openness, hence accessibility –
for whichever extent and number. The control of access
is shared. In this sense, it basically (when in doubt as an
assuring entitlement or a right) opens the way to ele-
ments of equality, free use (consumption), of communi-
cation or free co-operation and thus (also political)
equal participation (availability). In contrast, private
necessarily refers to the elements of releasing inequali-
ty by enclosure or exclusion (entitlement or enabling
control of access) and the restriction of use or availabi-
lity as well as hierarchical interaction. The differentiati-
on private/public now refers to two dimensions that are
often (since they are highly interdependent) not seen as
separate. On the one hand, politics and economy, state
and market, public or private power, public services are
treated as opposite to private capital; this refers to the
public sector as represented and incorporated by the
state as the general interest, as opposed to the special
interest of the private form of economy and the market.
On the other hand, the dimension of private life  (e.g.
the family) – where the world of feelings, intimacy, safe
spaces, and also the 'secret' and hidden spheres exist –
confronted with public life, public space, ideally with
the general transparency and accessibility without fear
or sanctions, and additionally the public as a communi-
cative arena, where the world and the private of the
many and of society are publicised (public opinion,
publicity) and where private persons assemble as public
audience.10
The opposing elements influence each other in both
dimensions: the public sphere is privatised and the pri-
vate sphere is also municipalised – an interaction that is
effective in both dimensions. Therefore, the strict diffe-
rentiation between ‘private’ and ‘public’ has been wea-
kened for some time (but nevertheless still applies).
Thus, for example, the issue is not about the state
increasingly invading the defensive barriers of private
life with its well-equipped surveillance and investigati-
ons, working towards a totality of the state and the
public sphere, while rich private people practically
appropriate the public sphere or subject the public sphe-
re to market forces. The variety of relationships between
the public and private spheres also crystallize into many
hybrid forms, whereby it is difficult to decide which of
the two is dominating: private interests finance public
goods and deliver services for the basic necessities of
life or supply "military security", decide on how the bil-
lion-market for the consumption of and public access to
music or lyrics is regulated, or determine how the inter-
net operates down to the last detail (the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) or ICANN or judge how
the handful of globally operating rating agencies assess
the credit worthiness of private and public actors on the
financial markets.11 The procedures of numerous inter-
national regulations concerning investment, competiti-
on arrangements, taxation, safety standards or industrial
relationships are in the meantime largely controlled by
private capital actors and their agencies. State determi-
ned law is replaced by laws from private contracts and
soft law (codes, guidelines, norms, standards) (Picciot-
to 2007). On the other hand, public companies produce
exclusively or predominantly for profit as global players
(e.g. municipal utilities) and have largely abandoned
their dedication to the public interest.  Irrespective of
which of these relationships we consider: the dominan-
ce of the private interest remains unbroken. The power-
ful hegemony of the private sphere, as it was built up
through the liberal market radicalism of the previous
three decades has lead to an unprecedented enclosure
and crowding out of  public goods and the basic servi-
ces of general interest and public ownership. “The
public sector shall be public”, was a demand once made
by Welcker, the old liberal (Welcker, 1864 p.744). This
is increasingly less the case: use of public goods and
services has become dependent on purchasing power
and basic public services of general interest are control-
led by the financial markets. The remaining public
ownership operates unrestrainedly according to normal
private capital profit maximising precepts and the
remaining tiny public spheres mutate to advertising
markets devoid of prospects. The substance of the
public sphere of the “public power” fades.  The hege-
mony of the private sphere has not only replaced the
public sense of values with the private sense of values,
but also has significantly changed what still remains of
the public sphere, in that it has imposed its market ope-
ration methods, concepts and objectives on the private
sphere. It is common practice in the meantime to arran-
ge exclusion from public services through fees and
charges, such that only those who at least participate in
the costs can avail themselves of public goods and ser-
vices such as education or culture, enjoy public property
such as parks, rivers or lakes or museums or gain access
to public areas of high utility value (transport systems).
In the language of the theory of ownership, public goods
convert to club goods which are no longer openly (or
11 „Public force is the power (estate) that is entrusted by the people
to the state and its law enforcement and use of violence is a power
that is liable to the people. It is public because it needs to be con-
stituted, legitimised and controlled by public proceedings ... Final-
ly, it is public because it is responsible for public welfare (oriented
towards the “people” by “proceedings”) and this responsibility
bestows it ... with an own legitimacy.“ (Rinken 2002, 44, empha-
sis added by authors). Each of these three aspects has meanwhile
been shifted massively towards the private and the particular inte-
rest.
9 This ultimately means: Public interest in the sense of the German
constitution is the “people” in its diverse and controversial social
reality.
10 Following Henning (2007) and Rinken (2002).
7freely) accessible and usable. This leads to inequality
effects and reduces welfare functions. Even the state, as
the controller of the greatest density of formal public
goods, is developing marketing interests in its liberal
democratic institutions (parliament, justice, political
infrastructure) and is increasingly drawing on a wide
range of private arrangements (e.g. secrecy, assigning
sovereign functions to private interests, introducing
business management practice, etc.). In short: the public
sphere itself has been privatised and is incorporating the
systematic production of social and political inequality
and exclusion of the private sphere into its way of ope-
rating.  The communality is weakened.  From the per-
spective of the marketing citizen, there is a pleasant
side-effect of the de-politicisation of the public sphere,
since this now primarily follows economic rules. 
Additionally, the second dimension of the distinction
between the private and public spheres operates between
mutual exclusion and mutual permeation: individuality,
intimacy and personal characteristics are being marketi-
sed, made into a commodity and commercially proces-
sed by the public media and the personal and private is
being advertised on the market and made permanent.
The personal and private is a moment of movement in
the public sphere and in the public space – and has
already long since adapted to marketing rules – and
resubjected as a private object of marketing that can
generate a commercial value. The market puts a value
on what was previously private, a second “privatising of
the private” (Henning 2007). At the same time, the "pri-
vate" is subsumed in the "real" sense. Richard Sennett
sees "the end of the public life" here (Sennett 2004).
Since the personal is individually and in principle more
than the person in the sense of the market economy, this
continually new normative adaptation to the economic
world breeds a feeling of failure and fear. The privatiza-
tion of the private always makes us feel quite miserable,
it entails high social costs. 
Talk of the “public sphere” thus signifies neither a mode
of production nor an economic order. This is therefore
not a question of the whole system of democratic socia-
lism or civilized capitalism. Finally, the public sphere is
not considered to be the tactical compromise interventi-
on of secret Left state interventionists or the resigned
friends of a civil society that has become unpopular. It
is rather all about working out a consistent answer to the
dominant practice and culture of privatisation – at eye-
level. The public sphere outlined here is understood to
link production and appropriation relationships as well
as the controlling relationships associated with them
(ownership, jobs ["public service"], availability), produ-
ced utility value (goods and services), various modes of
operation (especially communication, cooperation,
publicity) and their territories or places (spaces). For-
mulated politically, it is normatively distinguished by
what should produce democratising control and the pro-
motion of political, economic and social equality. Thus,
it is concerned with concrete effects and practicalities.
Working for the “public sphere” means democratising
and communalising ownership and social relationships,
companies, goods, places, or taking measures that affect
the basic services of general interest (public welfare),
organising communications, public governance to re-
duce inequality in the distribution of resources in
society and the distribution of political goods (partici-
pation, access). Thus, the public sphere can become an
effective medium of solidarity in the most varied realms
of life since it enables participative justice and accessi-
bility with respect to the elementary conditions of life
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